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BIAS AS AFFECTING CREDIBILITY
BY WILLIAM G. HALE
PROFESSOR OF LAW. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
DEAN EMERITUS. SCHOOL OF LAW. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
1. IN GENERAL
It is accepted doctrine that the bias of a wit-
ness will affect his credibility. The existence of
bias does not necessarily imply conscious falsehood.
It is quite likely however to shade at least, though
unwittingly, a witness' testimony, the bias may be in
favor of one side or against the other. Granted its
existence it may be appropriately taken into considera-
tion in weighing the testimony.
Since bias is a state of mind, its existence can
be determined only circumstantially. These circumstances
may consist of relationships (e.g. that witness is the
father of the plaintiff) or dealings or encounters cal-
culated to develop a prejudice (e.g. a fight with the
party against whom the testimony is given) or conduct,
or utterances. These designations are only by way of
illustration. As Mr. Wigmore (Sec. 949) has well said,
"The range of external circumstances from which probable
bias may be inferred is infinite." Experience tells us
for all practical purposes what those circumstances are
in individual situations. Evidence of bias is considered
of such value that the existence of facts, implicit of
it, may be ascertained either by cross-examination or
by extrinsic testimony. Considerations of auxiliary
policy, such as surprise or collateral issue, have not
been deemed relatively sufficient to limit the method of
proof.
Such differences as are found in the various juris-
dictions do not go to the fundamental principle under-
lying this evidence, but only to a minor element of pro-
cedure. The point at issue is whether a foundation must
be laid for resort to extrinsic testimony, by first makin
appropriate inquiry of the witness as to the facts indica
tive of bias.
The variations of rule in the United States are as
follows: (i) No foundation is required; (2) A foundation
is required where the alleged evidence of bias consists o
a statement made by the witness, following the analogy
of impeachment by a prior contradictory statement; (3)
In some jurisdictions the rule requiring a foundation
is extended, at least ostensibly, to cover cases where
evidence of bias takes the form of conduct. For ex-
ample, one finds in a few California cases language
like the following:
"Appellant sought to impeach a witness against him b
proof of declarations and conduct tending to show an
unfriendly feeling on the part of the witness toward
appellant. The witness was not asked concerning these
these acts or declarations. There was therefore no
foundation laid for the introduction of the impeaching
testimony of third persons and the rule excluding it
was correct. It is necessary to lay the foundation for such
evidence by calling the attention of the main witness
to the alleged acts and declarations and giving him an
opportunity to explain them, as in the case of incon-
sistent statements."
(Estate of Bedford, 158 Cal. 145, 147. It does not appear
what the "acts" were that were presumed to indicate bias.)
In discussing the question whether the rule applied
to impeachment by prior contradictory statements should
on principle be extended to the field of bias, Mr.
Wigmore (Sec. 953) remarks:
"Under ordinary circumstances it should be (i.e. where
the evidence of the bias takes the form of statements).
But the rule requiring such an inquiry before proving
a prior self-contradiction has been pushed so far, and
applied so stiffly and arbitrarily, that on the whole
it now does quite as much harm as good. To import it in
its present shape into any subject where it does not
strictly belong by precedent, seems unwise. Were the
rule properly administered, no doubt it should have a
place here also. But the rule, in any case, applies
only to utterances, not to conduct or circumstances
such as an assault or employment."
I agree with Mr. Wigmore that there is merit in
the principle which led the courts, at common law, to
declare that a witness should first have his attention
called to a prior self-contradiction before offering
extrinsic testimony thereto. The principle is based
not only on considerations of fairness to the witness
in making ample provision for explanation by him, and
on the very practical consideration of possible economy
of time which would be secured if the witness admitted
outright the prior statement, but also it is a principle
which would largely eliminate the evil of unfair sur-
prise as to a collateral issue of fact, since it would
serve as a warning that such issue might be pressed
later through extrinsic testimony.
In meeting Mr. Wigmore's objection to the exten-
sion of that principle based upon a too arbitrary handl-
ing of it by the courts, it may be sufficient to suggest,
as we approach the task of revamping the California Code,
that we safeguard the general principle against prostitu-
tion and thereby justify its extension to both circum-
stances and statements in the field of bias.
Statements found in court opinions, such as in the
quotation from the Supreme Court of California (supra)
that a foundation must be laid in the case of conduct,
as well as utterances, in.dicative of bias, call for
special consideration. First it may be asked whether
any of the courts actuaLly have gone beyond a case in-
volving utterances, and second, granting that they have
not, whether the law ought not to be extended even into
the field of conduct and perhaps beyond that. There is
some uncertainty as to the actual state of the law. It
arises from possible ambiguity in the use of the word
"act" or "conduct". For example, at times the evidence
of bias is that the witness attempted to bribe or other-
wise improperly influence another witness in the case.
This may be termed an "act". The evidence offered, how-
ever, takes the form of utterances. The actual inquiry,
therefore, is concerning what was said on a certain oc-
cassion. One may contrast with this, evidence of a
fight between the -witness and the party to the action
against whom he has testified. And then in still an-
other category may be placed evidence of a relationship
indicati-ve of bias, e.g. that witness is the brother of
the party for whom he is testifying, or an employee of
such party.
In considering the problems here suggested the
Queen's Case, (1820) 2 Brod. P.B. 284, 129 Eng. Reprint,
976, 897, offers a good starting point. The following
question was proposed to the Judges:
"Whether, according to the practice and usage of the courts
below, and according to law, when a witness in support of a
prosecution has been examined in chief, and has not been
asked on cross-examination as to any declarations made by
him, or acts done by him, to procure persons corruptly to
give evidence in support of the prosecution; it would be
competent to the party accused, to examine witnesses in his
defense, to prove such declarations or acts, without first
calling back such witness examined in chief to be examined
or cross-examined as to the fact, whether he ever made
such declarations or did such acts?"
This question was answered in the negative. The
English court sees no distinction in principle between
this set-up and that where the impeachment takes the
form of a prior self-contradictory statement. It gives
as the reasons which support the requirement of inquiry
first on cross-esamination, the following: (1) The
witness "has an opportunity of giving such reason, ex-
planation, or exculpation of his conduct, if any there
be, as the particular circumstances of the transaction
may happen to furnish, and thus the whole matter is
brought before the court at once, which, in our opinion,
is the most convenient course"; (2) If the opportunity
of explanation is not thus afforded in the first in-
stance, it may be wholly lost "for a witness, who has
been examined, and has no reason to suppose that his
further attendance is requisite, often departs the
Court, and may not be found or brought back until the
trial be at an end. So that, if evidence of this sort
could be adduced on the sudden and by surprise, with-
out any previous intimation to the witness or to the
party producing him, great injustice might be done to
the party • . • and one of the great objects of the
course of proceeding established in our Courts is the
prevention of surprise, as far as practicable, upon
any person who may appear therein. "
In discussing the point that the inquiry here
had reference to an "act", the court said:
"Now such acts of corruption are ordinarily accomplished
by words and speeches; an offer of money or other bene-
fit derives its entire character from the purpose for
which it was made, and this purpose is notified and
explained by words; so that an inquiry into the act of
corruption will usually be, both in form and effect, an
inquiry as to the words spoken by the supposed corrupter;
and the words spoken for such a purpose do, in our opin-
ion, fall within the same rule and principle, with re-
gard to the course of proceeding in our courts, as words
spoken for any other purpose; and we do not, therefore,.
perceive any solid distinction with regard to this point
between the declarations and the acts mentioned in the
question proposed to us. It will be obvious, that the
observations regarding convenience and inconvenience,
which we have taken the liberty to offer to your Lord-
ships as to the proof of words, are alike applicable to
the proof of acts."
Nice and subtle distinctions.
If the rule demanding a foundational inquiry in a
case of bias based solely on words is sound, it is be-
lieved that the view of the English judges is sound in
including cases of bias evidenced by conduct plus words.
The practical difficulty of drawing a line between these
two types of cases furnishes an adequate reason for so
formulating the rule that it would be unnecessary to
make the distinction. But it is submitted that there
is further and more fundamental reason for the extension
of the rule. One reason often urged for requiring a
foundation in the case of alleged contradictory state-
ments is that utterances are seldom transmitted by the
bearer with absolute exactness but rather in the form
of impressions and hence the utterer should have an
opportunity to explain his statements and thus put them
perhaps in their true light. Inflection even can change
a meaning. Tradition has it that in old frontier much
depended upon the presence or absence of a smile on the
part of the 6olorful conversationalist when he engaged
in certain forceful repartee. It would seem to follow
that wherever utterances come into the picture, even if
acts also figure in it, the importance of explanation
may be quite as great. But this step may logically
lead to another. If the evidence of bias consists only
of acts, ambiguity may be involved. The fact of bias
is an implication from the acts. An exchange of blows
may be a fight or a friendly bout. Thus the way is
paved for including within the rule all cases of con-
duct indicative of bias, whether accompanied by evi-
dence of words or not.
Finally it remains to ask whether bias implied
from relationship falls in the same category. I believe
it does not. Whether the witness is a brother or em-
ployee of the party for whom he testifies, calls for no
explanation. The only issue here involved is whether
the relationship actually exists. The principle, there-
fore, which has been relied on in the foregoing situa-
tions has no application here. Nevertheless, may it no-t
also be desirable to require a preliminary inquiry of
the witness concerning such matters before undertaking
to call other witnesses thereto? The law of evidence
in more than one instance emphasizes the evil of sur-
prise. Neither the witness who is sought thus to be
impeached nor the party who calls him can anticipate
such an issue. If no inquiry is made of the witness,
during his cross-examination, he may well be dismissed
and may be out of reach when the attack is after made
on him. Neither he nor anyone else therefore could.be
readily called in rebuttal. To demand a preliminary
inquiry of the witness, during his cross-examination,
imposes no special hardship on the cross-examiner. If
the witness admits the relationship. as he may if it
is true, time is saved. If he denies it. the inquiry
will have served as a warning to prepare by the call-
ing of other witnesses to sustain him in case the cross-
examiner later follows up this attempted impeachment.
The requirement should not be absolute, but should be
applied subject to a reasonable discretion.
It is recognized, of course, that we here would
be departing from traditional procedures, but we offer
the suggestion as worthy of consideration. It is also
recognized that the principle underlying such extension
carries beyond the field of bias. It would include all
modes of impeachment in which the facts, impeaching in
their character, would be within the knowledge of the
witness and which are now open to proof by extrinsic
testimony - for example that witness was intoxicated
at the time of the event, or that witness had been con-
victed of a crime.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Allen v Fincher,
(1914) 187 Ala. 599, 65 So. 946, while deciding on the
basis of settled authority in that state that evidence
of bias could be offered without any prior foundation
inquiry, nevertheless gives strong moral support to the
views here expressed, in the following language:
"As the multiplication of issues is not desirable, it
would seem that the better rule would require the party
against whom a witness is testifying to develop, on cross-
examination, the fact of the bias of the witness. If, on
the cross-examination, the witness admits the facts show-
ing his bias, then there should, at once, be an end of the
matter. If he, on such cross-examination, denies the
facts showing such bias, then the party against whom he
has testified should be - and in all courts, including our
own, is - allowed to show by other witnesses the existence
of such facts . . . While for administrative purposes, the
better rule on the subject is, in our opinion, the one which
we have above indicated, and while the question is one only
of practice, our predecessors, in the cases above cited,
have declared the rule in this state to be as we have quoted
it (viz: that nb preliminary inquiry on cross-examination is
required.)"
2 CASES DEALING WITH BIAS, WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE
REQUIREMENTS AS TO FOUNDATION.
People v Ye Foe, (1907) 4 Cal. App. 730, 737, 89
?ac. 450. The State was allowed to impeach one of defen-
iant's witnesses by extrinsic testimony that this witness
iad offered a bribe to one Edgar to give certain testi-
nony. favorable to the defendant. It was objected that a
sufficient foundation had not been laid in that the at-
tention of the witness had not been called to "the parties
)resent at the time of the alleged bribery conversation."
In affirming the trial court, the Appellate Court de-
3lares:
"The better course would have been to have called the atten-
tion of the witness Jue Doe Men to the persons present at
the alleged conversation, but the omission to do this is not
necessarily fatal to receiving impeaching testimony. The
attention of the witness was called to the circumstances of
time and place, and it clearly appeared that he understood
the occasion referred to and the conversation to which his
attention was directed. He gave his version of the conver-
sation and denied that he offered Edgar twenty dollars.
NOTE: It will be observed that the inquiry related to a
conversation. It is assumed that a foundation was necessary. The
opinion shows some liberality in the application of the rule.
People v Delbos, (1905) 146 Cal. 734, 738. The
3nly statement in the case bearing on the question of
impeachment is as follows:
"There were other exceptions to the refusal. of some evidence
tending to lay the foundation for proof that the prosecution
was instituted by the prosecuting witness for the purpose of
extorting money from the defendant. It was proper to show
this fact to impeach the motives of the prosecuting witness,
but the questions asked should have been preceded by a di-
rect question. The Prosecuting witness should have been
first asked if she had not begun the prosecution for that
Purpose. The ruling was technically correct."
NOTE: Without the entire record in this case before one,
it is difficult to get the import of this language. It seems fair
to assume that evidence of such motive would consist chiefly of
statements. If so the case falls in the "utterance" category.
Estate of Bedfore, (1910) 158 Cal. 115, 110 Pac.
302. This case, also, is short on fact background.
Nothing appears except what is incorporated in the quo-
tation from the opinion which appears (supra) in the
text of this memorandum. It is there indicated that
"declarations and conduct" were offered as "tending to
show an unfriendly feeling." It does not appear
whether the "declarations" and the "conduct" were in
any way inter-related. The case, therefore, can not
be cited definitely to the proposition that were the
hostile episode consists exclusively of an "act" the
rule calling for a foundation inquiry would be applied.
Hence, quaere as to a case involving "act" only.
Baker v Joseph, (1860) 16 Cal. 173. 177. This
case holds that proof of declarations of hostility by
a witness is governed by the rule applicable to im-
peachment by proof of prior contradictory statements.
The Queen's Case, quoted from (supra) in the text of
this memorandum, is cited and relied upon. The follow-
ing discussion of the problem presented is instructive:
"It is said that the Court erred in excluding proof of the
state of feeling of the witnesses Oppenheim and Brooks. On
cross-examination, Oppenheim testified that he had no ani-
mosity towards Joseph. He also testified that, 'since the
commencement of this suit, and at no other time, I never
stated to Mrs. Fox that I would ruin defendant, or words
to that effect! The appellant offered to prove by Fox
that, in conversation with appellant, held about the time
of the commencement of this action, Oppenheim told him he
would ruin the defendant. Some other testimony of like
import was offered and rejected. The ground of this re-
jection was the obvious one that the questions were not
directly put to the witness, whether he had made these
statements, and proper information as to time and place,
and the precise matter which was to be used against him
given, so that an opportunity might be afforded to rebut
or explain it. It is unquestionable that where a witness
is sought to be impeached by proof of contradictory state-
ments, made or alleged to have been made by him, it must
be brought to the knowledge of the witness what the
precise matter of these contradictions is, and the time
and place of making them. This rule is based upon a prin-
ciple of justice, which requires that the witness have a
fair opportunity of explaining what, without such explana-
tion, might appear to be suspicious. But it is said that
the same rule does not hold in regard to expressions of
hostility or ill (178) feeling on the part of the witness.
It is argued that the value and weight of testimony, in
some degree, depend upon the state'of feeling of a witness;
that a witness, whose feelings are embittered against a
party, is not so worthy of credence as a witness standing
indifferent; and that, therefore, proof of this state of
unfriendly feeling is admissible, as independent evidence
affecting the testimony of the witness. This distinction
is more plausible than sound. No mode of ascertaining
the state of feeling of the witness exists, except that
disclosed by the declarations or the acts of the witness
sought to be impeached by these declarations. The same
principle, which assures to him the privilege of explana-
tion when contradictory declarations are offered, applies
to assure him the right of explanation, when declarations
of hostility are sought to be introduced. In effect, it
is attempted to be shown that the witness has asserted,
directly or impliedly, something different from the pre-
sent testimony; that, whereas he professes or holds him-
self out to be an indifferent and impartial witness;
testifying without prejudice or feeling, yet, really and
in fact, he is a prejudiced witness, whose passions color
his testimony. The weight of authority and the reason of
the rule, are as we have stated them. We can see no dis-
tinction between admitting declarations of hostility of
the witness, by way of impairing the force of his testi-
mony, and admitting contradictory statements for the same
purpose, so far as this rule is concerned; for, in either
case, an opportunity should be given the witness to ex-
plain what he said. We understand this doctrine to be
laid down by the best standards. Thus, PH. Ev 2 vol.
435, says: 'The rule that a witness ought to be cross-
examined as to contradictory statements, before they can
be admitted in evidence to impeach the credit of his
testimony, has been extended not only to contradictory
statements, but also to other declarations of the wit-
ness, and to acts done by him through the medium of
declarations or words; so that, if it is intended to of-
fer evidence of former declarations of a witness, or of
acts done by him touching the cause, not with a view to
contradict his statement upon oath, but for the purpose
of discrediting him as a corrupt witness, or as one who
would corrupt other witnesses, in this case also, it has
been determined that the witness should be previously
questioned as to them in cross-examination. This appears
from an answer of the Judges to a question put to them by
the House of Lords, (in the Queen 's Case ) in the course
of the proceedings before referred to. The question was
in the following words: "If a witness in support of (179)
a prosecution has been examined in chief, and has not been
asked in cross-examinations as to declarations made by him,
or as to acts done by him, to procure persons corruptly to
give evidence in support of the prosecution, whether it
would be competent to the party accused to examine witness
in his defense, for the purpose of proving such declara-
tions or acts, without first calling back the witness to
be examined or cross-examined as to the fact whether he
ever made such declarations or did such acts?' Another
question was the following: 'If a witness, called on the
part of a plaintiff or prosecutor, gives evidence against
the defendant, and if, after the cross-examination of the
witness by the defendant's counsel, they discover that the
witness so examined has corrupted or endeavored to corrupt
another person to give false testimony in such case;
whether the defendant's counsel may not be permitted to
give evidence of such corrupt act of the witness, without
calling him back?' The Judges were of opinion, on both
questions, that the proposed proof could not be adduced
without a previous cross-examination of the witness as to
the subject matter, 'The general rule,' says the Lord
Chief Justice, 'and the general practice is this: If it
be intended to bring the credit of a witness into ques-
tion, by proof of anything that he may have said or de-
clared touching the cause, the witness is first asked,
upon cross-examination, whether or not he has said or
declared that that which is intended to be proved.'
(Carpenter v Wall, 11 A. & E. 803; 2 Barb. 211; 121d.
596; 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 462.) This author says that the
rule is extended, not only to contradictory statements
by the witness, but to other declarations, and to acts
done by him through the medium of verbal communications
or correspondence, which are offered with the view to
contradict his testimony in chief, or to prove him a
corrupt witness himself, or to have been guilty of at-
tempting to corrupt others.'
"The offer to introduce the proof of the declarations
of the witnesses, Oppenheim and Brooks, did not meet
the requirements of the rule, as laid down in the Queen's
Case, and now generally recognized. There was no such
specification of time, place and occasion as to give to
the witness the full opportunity of explanation."
People v Pickens, (1923) 61 Cal. App. 405, 408.
Extrinsic evidence may be offered to show that a wit-
ness and a party, for whom he testifies, are members of
the same lodge, without first inquiring on cross-exam-
ination as to such fact.
NOTE: This is dictum in the case. (See following cases
in which the bias was evidenced by statements: Silvey v Hodgdon,
(1874) 48 Cal. 185; People v Gardner, (1897) 98 Cal. 127, 132;
Fagan v Lentz, (1909) 156 Cal. 681; Ash v Soo Sing Lung, (1918)
177Cal. 356, 170 Pac. 843; People v Nelson, (1928) 90 Cal. App.
27, 34, 265 Pac. 366.
People v Brooks, (1892) 131 N.Y. 321. The trial
court ruled out the following evidence, calculated to
show the bias of a witness for the state against the
defendant, on the ground that the state's witness had
not been cross-examined as to the matter. Defendant
was on the stand and was questioned by her counsel as
follows: "Now state whether or not Charlotte (the
witness for the state) was friendly to you or unfriend-
ly?" "Did you and Charlotte have frequent difficulties
during that time?" Did Charlotte assault you upon
other occasions previous to the fire?"
HELD: The trial court erred in ruling out this exam-
ination. No foundation is required in such a case."
It does not fall within the principle applicable to
impeachment by prior contradictory statements.
NOTE: This case is cited with approval in People v
Pickends (supra) .
Brink v Stratton, (1903, N.-Y.) 68 N.E. 148.
Action on a promissory note. The defendants allege
payment by one C. C was called as a witness for the
defendant. Three witnesses testified as to the repu-
tation of C for truth and veracity. C was then called
as a witness and asked the following questions concern-
ing the witnesses who had testified as to his bad repu-
tation, all of which were objected to and in each case
the objection was sustained.
1. Was Mr. Boyd opposing you and you opposing
Mr. Boyd for a number of years in your papers?
2. Each one attacking the other through his
paper?
3. What have been the relations between you and
Mr. Wilbur?
4. Was Arthur Wilbur one time superintendent of
schools?
5. Did your paper attack him?
6. I will ask you whether or not by reason of
the position of the Forum against Mr. Wilbur,
whether or not he was defeated as superinten-
dent of the schools?
HELD: That it was prejudicial error to exclude the
above questions. The court reasoned as follows:
"That it was competent to prove the hostility of any or
all of these witnesses towards the defendants, or either
of them, by their cross-examination or by other testimony;
that it was not necessary that the witness should be first
examined as to his hostility before calling other witnesses
is not limited to contradicting him in case he denies hos-
tility - is well established by the decisions of this state.
"The extent, however, to which an examination may go for
the purpose of proving the hostility of a witness must be,
to some extent at least, within the discretion of the trial
judge. It should be direct and positive, and not very re-
mote and uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the
main issue in the case cannot be properly suspended to make
out a case of hostile feeling by mere circumstantial evi-
dence from which such hostility or malice may or may not be
inferred."
People v Mallon, (1906) 116 App. Div. 425, 101
N.Y. Supp. 814, 818.
"The appellant urges that there was reversible error in the
exclusion of testimony showing the hostility of the witness
O'Brien towards the defendant. One Tausig was called by
the defendant and, after testifying to some facts relative
to the shooting, stated that he had known William O'Brien
for six or seven years, and that he remembered seeing him
two nights after the shooting occurred at No. 23 Bowery.
Whereupon this question was asked, 'Did O'Brien at that
time state whether he would tell the truth or tell a lie as
to what happened that morning in reference to Mallon?'
Which question he was not permitted to answer. The appel-
lant now urges that this question was put to the witness
for the purpose of proving hostility on the part of the
witness O'Brien toward the defendant, and that it was error
to exclude it. O'Brien had not been interrogated while
on the stand in regard to any such occurrence or conversa-
tion. The evidence was offered, of course, for the pur-
pose of impeaching O'Brien.
"There are two rules firmly established by the decisions
in this case .
"The second rule is that the hostility of a witness to-
wards a party, against whom he is called, may be proved
by cross-examination of the witness, or witnesses may be
called who can swear to facts showing it. It would have
been competent, therefore, without previous cross-examina-
tion upon the subject, to have proved facts tending to
establish hostile relations between the witness O'Brien
and the defendant. The question is whether, under this
rule, mere utterances of the witness claimed to show hos-
tility can be proved, without preliminary interrogation
as to those utterances of the witness himself. The rea-
son for the rule requiring, in the case of mere contra-
dictory statements, that there should be a preliminary
interrogation, is primarily based upon the uncertainty of
hearsay evidence; that when one person undertakes to say,
after more or less lapse of time, what another person
said, the accuracy of the repetition depends upon the
correct understanding in the first instance of the state-
ment, its accurate preservation in the memory of the
testifying witness, its accurate reproduction upon the
trial, together with the circumstances under which it
was first uttered and its relation to the rest of the
transaction of which it purports to be a part. With
these numerous chances for misunderstanding, forgetful-
ness, and misrepresentation, it has always been thought,
in this state at least, that it was due, not only to the
convenience of trials and the interest of justice, but
also to the rights of the witness, that he should have
an opportunity of tendering his version of the matter
in the first instance. Therefore preliminary interroga-
tion of a witness as to contradictory utterances has
always been required.
"There does not seem to me to be any reason why the
same rule should not apply to mere utterances claimed
to indicate hostility. A careful examination of the
cases in this state has -failed to discover the estab-
lishment of a contrary rule."
Reference is here made to People v Brooks (supra)
and Brink v Stratton (supra) and it is pointed out that
in neither case was the "question of utterances" in-
volved. The court concludes that the evidence offered
in the principle case was properly excluded.
PeoPle v Lustig, (1912) 206 N.Y. 162, 171.
"Another of the errors, which I regard as grave, was com-.
mitted in refusing to allow the witness Thomas, called for
the defense, to testify concerning a conversation, which he
had with Mr. and Mrs. Livingston about the defendant. Thomas
testified to having the conversation some time in December,
1909, in the Livingstons' drug store, and was asked to 'tell
the jury what was said in respect to this defendant.' This
question was objected to by the district attorney as im-
material, irrelevant and incompetent. Whereupon, the de-
fendant's counsel stated: 'I desire to show the hostility
of Mr. and Mrs. Livingston.' The court, then, asked 'Did
you question Mrs. Livingston touching this hostility?'
Defendant's counsel replied, 'I did not question her, but
it seems to me that I did not have to.? The witness was
not allowed to answer and the defendant excepted. Any ob-
jection to the form of the question was obviated by reason
of the ground of the exclusion of the evidence. The rule
is settled in this state, by repeated decisions of this
court, that the hostility of a witness towards a party,
against whom he is called, may be proved by any competent
evidence. As it was stated in People v Brooks, (131 N.Y.
321,325), the hostility 'may be shown by cross-examination
of the witness, or witnesses may be called who can swear
to facts showing it. There can be no reason for holding
that the witness must first be examined as to his hostil-
ity, and that then, and not till then witnesses may be
called to contradict him.'"
NOTE: Reliance upon People v Brooks, seems misplaced. In
the Brooks case the evidence of bias consisted of conduct, not
utterances. The Stratton case is also cited. But it likewise
and for the same reason is not in point. However, the Lustif
case was decided by the Court of Appeals, and would, therefore,
seem to represent the New York law. No reference is made to
People v Mallon. But the HalIon case was decided in the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court and therefore does not stand
against the Lustig decision.
Sullivan v State, (1932) 25 Ala. 140, 142 So.
110.
FACTS: The defendant is charged with assault
with a deadly weapon. It appears that he shot one
Moore with a double barrelled shot gun. As a part of
his defense S offered to prove that Moore, the prose-
cuting witness had on the morning of the attack, al-
leged in the complaint, set fire to defendant's hay
stack. This evidence was offered on two theories.
(1) That Moore had committed a felony and defendant
was entitled under the statute to use force in arrest-
ing Moore, (2) That the evidence tended to show bias
and prejudice on the part of Moore.
HELD: That the evidence was inadmissible on both
grounds. As to the second ground the court states:
"That defendant insists that this evidence was relevant
as tending to show the animus and bias of Henry Moore as
a witness. This insistence is untenable. The proper way
to show bias of a witness is to ask him directly the
state of his feelings, and, if he denies bias, to resort
to facts and circumstances tending to show it. In this
case the proper predicate was not laid for the introduc-
tion of independent circumstances."
Southern Ry. Co. v Harrison, (1914) 191 Ala. 436,
67 So. 597. Suit for injuries sustained by an employee
of the defendant Company while riding on an engine of
one of the defendant's trains. One Ernest was call.ed
as a witness for the plaintiff. The defendant on cross-
examination asked him if he had been discharged from the
employ of the defendant company at or near the time of
the accident. The plaintiff objected to the question
and the objection was sustained. The defendant appeals
fromtthis ruling.
HELD: The evidence was properly excluded. The court
said:
"The trial court committed no reversible error in declining
to let the defendant ask the witness Ernest, on cross-ex-
amination, to state whether or not he was laid off by the
Sourthern Railway Company on the morning of the accident.
The witness had jus-t stated he had not worked for the de-
fendant since that time, and it was therefore immaterial
to the issues involved whether he quit or was laid off by
the company, unless, as is now suggested in brief of counsel,
that the fact he was laid off by the defendant was a cir-
cumstance showing ill feeling towards the said defendant,
and was a circumstance affecting his credibility. If this
be true, the purpose or relevancy of the evidence should
have been suggested to the trial court, as there is nothing
in the question which would show that it was being asked to
show bias on the part of the witness. Moreover, the more
proper and orderly way to have shown bias or ill will was
to have asked the witness the direct question as to his
state of feelings towards the defendant, and he may have
ad/ritted that it was bad. On the other hand if he said it
was good, then the defendant could resort to the introduc-
tion of facts and circumstances showing that the witness
was biased against the defendant."
Creeping Bear v State, (1905) 113 Tenn. 322, 87
S.W. 653. The defendant was indicated for murder. W,
a witness for the prosecution, was called to testify to
the facts of the murder. On cross-examination the de-
fendant sought to bring out that W. was a friend of the
deceased and that during the pendency of an appeal in a
former case he had taken an active part in trying to
keep people from signing a petition seeking a pardon for
the defendant. The offer of this proof was refused by
the trial court. The defendant then offered a witness
to testify to the friendship and the conduct of the wit-
ness for the prosecution as independent evidence. This
second offer of proof was again rejected. Defendant
appeals from a judgment of conviction holding that the
action of the trial court was error.
HELD: That. the trial court committed error. The
court said:
"The testimony should have been admitted. It is always
competent to prove tie friendliness or unfriendliness of
a witness, his partiality for one party or hostility to
to the other, in order that the jury may judge of his
credibility and the trustworthiness of his testimony. It
is the experience of trial courts that witnesses are
often as much influenced in testifying by feelings of
friendship or hostility to parties to the case as by
direct pecuniary interest in the result of the trial, and
for this reason proof of the relation of the witness to
the parties may be shown by proving his conduct and ex-
pressions in relation to them by cross-examination of the
witness or independently by witnesses called for that pur-
pose. In the latter case the best practice is to direct
the adverse witness' attention, where the conversations
and statements are Proposed to be proved, to the time and
place had or are and to whom spoken but this is in the
discretion of the court and not absolutely necessary,
since the evidence is not for the sole purpose of
contradiction. The answer of the witness on cross-examin-
ation is not conclusive, because evidence of his feelings
towards the parties is relevant and material."
Sasser v State, (1907) 129 Ga. 541, 59 S.E. 255.
The defendant was indicted for murder. A witness
who testified for the state was asked by defendant's
counsel on cross-examination if he had not had a fight
with the defendant and 'hit at him' in a difficulty
which had occurred between them. The question was ob-
Jected to and the trial court refused to allow the wit-
ness to answer.
HELD: That the trial court acted properly. The court
said:
"The purpose of this testimony was to show the state of
feeling on the part of the witness toward the defendant.
Cr. Code 1895 provides: 'The state of the witness's
feelings to the parties, and his relationship, may always
be proved for the consideration of the jury. A party can-
not prove a difficulty between a witness and a party to
the case on trial to show bad feeling on the part of the
witness toward him, unless the witness denies that such a
feeling exists. Whenever the witness denies that such
feeling exists, it is proper to permit the witness to be
interrogated as to any difficulty or trouble between them,
for the purpose of rebutting this denial and showing that
such feeling does exist. It does not appear from this
assignment of error that the witness had denied having bad
feeling toward the defendant . . . If a witness admits
ill feeling toward a party to a case, he cannot be inter-
rogated as to difficulties between them in order to show
bad feeling; but, if a ,witness denies having ill feeling
toward a party to a case, he.can be interrogated as to
difficulties between him and said party, in order to show
bad feeling. A witness can be shown to be friendly with
and entertain good feeling toward a party to a case, and,
should he deny that this is true evidence is admissible
to rebut such denial and show that such friendly state
exists."
Barrdctough v Union Pac. R. Co. (1932) 331 Mo.
157. 52 S.W. (2d) 998. Action for wrongful death.
Burke, the conductor of the defendant company at the
time of the accident testified in behalf of the plain-
tiff. As a part of the defendant's case the superin-
tendent in charge of the section of the road where the
accident occurred was called and was asked the follow-
ing questions. After it was shown that Burke had been
discharged from the employ of the defendant company at
the time of the accident. "Q. After Mr. Burke was
discharged, did you have any controversy with him about
back pay? Q. I am asking if you personally, as super-
intendent, had any controversy with him about back pay?
Q. What was the controversy between you and Mr. Burke
about, after you discharged him?" The witness was re-
quired to answer that there was a controversy but he
was not required to answer the other questions. On ap-
peal it was contended that the questions were proper.
It was contended for defendant that the question
tended to show bias on the part of the witness Burke
and that they should therefore have been allowed.
It was contended for plaintiff that even though
the questions showed bias on the part of Burke they were
improper because Burke had been asked no questions as to
his bias or as to these matters and therefore no proper
foundation for the questions had been laid.
HELD: That the foundation was not necessary and that
the witness should have been allowed to answer the
questions. The court said:
"Plaintiff says that Burke was never asked about any such
controversy, and therefore it was an improper attempt at
impeachment without laying any foundation therefor. It
is true that a witness cannot be impeached, by showing
statements he has made, unless a foundation is laid by
asking him if he made such statements. Here, however,
no statements of Burke were shown, but only the fact that
a controversy about back pay had existed between him and
the company, and defendant was not permitted to show any
details of the controversy. It will further be noted
that the court said that it was sufficient ?to show he
had a controversy' and that plaintiff's counsel agreed.
"There is considerable conflict of authority as to the
necessity of laying a foundation to impeach a witness for
bias or hostility. 'In some jurisdictions, where ordin-
arily a foundation must be laid to contradict a witness,
his statements or acts which show hostility or bias are
considered of a different character, and no foundation is
required to be laid. In still other states a distinction
is drawn between acts and statements showing hostility or
bias, a foundation being required in the latter instance,
but not in the former.' It seems reasonable, however, as
stated by Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 343, that the
rule requiring preliminary inquiry of the witness before
offering evidence to show his bias 'applies only to utter-
ances, not to conduct or circumstances, such as an assult
or an employment.' Other illustrations of facts or issue
of bias without a preliminary inquiry of the witness are:
Relationship to a party by blood or marriage, pendancy of
litigation between the witfiess and the party against whom
he testifies, and a quarrel or trouble between them."
The court, however, is of the opinion that the
questions as to what the details of he quarrel, etc.
are is not admissible and that the trial court, there-
fore, acted properly in refusing to allow answers to
the specific questions as to the details of the quarrel
here in question.
Brody v Cooper, (1924) 45 R.I. 453, 124 Atl. 2.
The suit was for damages sustained to plaintiff's car
in a collision. The deposition of the insurance ad-
juster was offered in evidence. The defendant sought
to show that the witness who gave the deposition was
the insurance adjuster for the company in which plain-
tiff was insured and to prove by that, fact that he was
biased in favor of the plaintiff.
HELD: That in the absence of a proper foundation this
testimony was not admissible. The court said:
"Granting that defendant can impeach the credibility of
the deponent, the rules of evidence must still be observed,
The evidence to which objection was taken at most might be
held to show that the witness had a cause for bias; it
does not prove bias in fact and cannot be proved as an
independent fact. Even if it was admissible, the witness
who is to be impeached must first in cross-examination be
interrogated in. regard to it and given an opportunity to
deny bias or explain the extent thereof or the reason
therefor. The fact that in the circumstances the defen-
dent could not cross-examine the witness does not change
the rule."
NOTE: The case is weakened as to the above point by rea-
son of the fact that the court- holds the defendant unable to im-
peach the witness at all because the deposition was taken at the
defendant's request in the first instance and the witness was
therefore the witness of. the defendant.
Ellsworth v Potter, (1869) 41 Vt. 685.
"It is true that a witness who is examined in open court
may not be impeached by proving his declarations out of
court, unless he is first particularly inquired of upon
the subject. There is some reason for applying the same
rule to mere proof of ill feeling which has only been
evinced by unkind or threatening remarks about the party;
but when there has been an open quarrel or a suit at law
between the party and the adverse witness, it becomes a
substantive fact azd may be proved like relationship, or
interest in the event of the suit, without previous in-
quiry of the witness in regard to it. . . . The proof of
such a difficulty, law-suit, interest, or relationship is
not, in the ordinary sense, impeaching testimony, al-
though it may be considered in determining the credit to
be given the witness."
Fag en v Lentz, (1909) 156 Cal. 681, 105 Pac. 951.
The facts and the holding of the court are succinctly
stated in the following excerpts from the opinion:
"Mrs. Minnie Tucker was a witness for the plaintiff, but
was not questioned and did not give any testimony as to
her feelings toward either of the defendants, or as to
the making of any statement tending to show hostility or
bias. On the direct examination of defendant, Charles W.
Lentz, he was asked whether Mrs. Tucker did not, after
some difficulty between her husband and himself, shake
her hand and fist at him and say? 'I will give you all
the court you want, before I get through with you.' An
objection to this question was sustained. It is settled
in this state tha't the same foundation as must be laid
for introducing prior contradictory statements of a wit-
ness is equally necessary to the introduction of evi-
dence of declarations showing hostility or ill feeling
on the part of the witness, in other words, that before
such evidence is introduced, the witness so sought to
be attacked must be asked as to the making of such state-
ments. . . . The ruling of the trial court sustaining the
objection to the question asked Mr. Lentz relative to Mrs.
Tucker was in accord with this rule."
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